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The Court of Appeals of Maryland held in Post v. 
Bregman, 349 Md. 142,707 A.2d 
806 (1998), that the Maryland 
Lawyers' Rules of Professional 
Conduct establish public policy 
which should be given the force 
of law. Due to this 
characterization, Rule 1.5(e), 
which deals with the splitting of 
fees among attorneys who are 
not part of the same firm, is not 
strictly limited to the disciplinary 
proceedings provided by the 
Rules and may be enforced in 
private agreements between 
attorneys. Agreements entered 
into in clear violation of the Rule, 
therefore, can be rendered 
unenforceable. 
In 1988, Stanley Taylor 
("Taylor") approached Douglas 
Bregman ("Bregman") about 
representing him in a workers' 
compensation claim. Bregman 
informed Taylor that he did not 
handle such matters and referred 
him to Alan F. Post ("Post"). 
Taylor then retained Post to 
handle the compensation case as 
well as a subsequent tort claim. 
With Taylor's consent, Post 
retained the firm of Connerton, 
Ray, & Simon ("Connerton") to 
assist with the case. 
Connerton eventually 
withdrew from the case and Post 
retained the firm of Paulson, 
Nace, Norwin, & Sellinger 
("Paulson") to assume the role of 
lead counsel. This necessitated 
a new fee arrangement because 
Paulson insisted on receiving 
two-thirds of the contingency fee. 
Post and Bregman decided that 
sixty percent of the remaining 
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one-third would go to Post, 
leaving Bregman with forty 
percent of one-third. The deal 
was conditional on Bregman 
contributing that same 
percentage of work and expenses 
to the case. On November 1, 
1994, Post received $260,000 
from the settlement of the Taylor 
case. Post then balked at 
honoring the agreement. In order 
to settle the issue, Post filed a 
complaint for declaratory relief in 
the Circuit Court for Montgomery 
County. Post asked the court to 
declare the agreement with 
Bregman unenforceable because 
it violated public policy. He 
believed the Maryland Lawyers' 
Rules of Professional Conduct 
(UMLRPC") should govern and 
that Rule 1.5(e) would be violated 
if the arrangement was upheld. 
The Rule states that a division of 
fee between lawyers from 
different firms is acceptable only 
if the division is proportional to 
the work done by each lawyer. 
Bregman filed a counterclaim, 
contending that he had done aU 
the work that was asked of him 
and was entitled to the share 
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previously agreed upon. 
The trial court, treating the 
case as a breach of contract 
action, granted Bregman's motion 
for summary judgment and 
determined that there was no 
longer a need to issue declaratory 
judgment. Accordingly, the court 
ordered Post to pay the amount 
owed to Bregman plus interest. 
The Court of SpeCial Appeals of 
Maryland affirmed the trial court's 
decision, holding that the 
agreement was clear and that 
courts should refrain from 
applying MLRPC, which are rules 
passed by the judiciary not the 
legislature, in contract disputes. 
Before turning its attention to 
the claim that MLRPC should 
govern the fee arrangement, the 
court of appeals considered the 
trial court's decision to dismiss 
the action for declaratory 
judgement. Post, 349 Md. at 159, 
707 A.2d at 814. While it is 
permissible for a court to dismiss 
an action for declaratory 
judgment if the issue raised 
becomes moot, the court of 
appeals did not believe that such 
was the case here. Id. Rather 
than dealing with the several 
issues which the parties sought to 
clarify, the trial court rendered a 
judgment on the breach of 
contract claim in order to resolve 
the dispute. Id. Thus, the trial 
court never reached the MLRPC 
issue. The court of appeals 
determined that the dispute in this 
case was far from the ordinary 
breach of contract and the parties 
were entitled to ua specific written 
declaration" of their rights. Id. at 
106,707 A.2d at 815. 
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The court of appeals next 
turned to the issue surrounding 
the application of MLRPC, in 
particular, Rule 1.5(e). Id. at 161, 
707 A.2d at 815, The court found 
the effect of the Rule had been 
viewed by the lower courts' in two 
different ways, as a condition 
incorporated into the contract or, 
like any law, as a supervening 
check on the contract. Id. at 162, 
707 A.2d at 815. The court 
believed that this contradiction 
arose from the larger issue of the 
cognizance and enforceability of 
MLRPC as a "statement of public 
policy, equivalent in effect to a 
statute." Id. 
The court looked at the effect 
the code of professional 
responsibility had in other states, 
as well as in Maryland. Id. at 162, 
707 A.2d at 815-16. Unlike other 
states, the court found that the 
Maryland rules were not "self-
imposed internal regulations" but 
were adopted by the court in 
order to thoroughly regulate the 
practice of law. Id. at 162-63, 707 
A.2d at 816. The court held that 
such a detailed regulation of any 
occupation, "the integrity of which 
is vital to nearly every other 
institution and endeavor of our 
society, constitutes an expression 
of public policy having the force of 
law." Id. at 163,707 A.2d at 816. 
Only the court of appeals had 
been granted the authority to 
establish MLRPC, not the 
legislature, and therefore the 
code operates with the same 
legal force as a statute. Id. at 
163-64,707 A.2d at 816. 
Turning from the general 
operation of MLRPC, the court 
stated that the real issue in the 
instant case was whether 
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MLRPC, specifically Rule 1.5(e), 
was enforceable outside the 
context of the traditional 
disciplinary proceeding. Id. at 
164,707 A.2d at 817. The court 
found that courts in Maryland and 
elsewhere have applied specific 
rules outside the disciplinary 
context. Id. Furthermore, Rule 
1.5 itself had been applied in 
cases outside Maryland to 
determine the validity of fee-
sharing agreements. Id. at 166, 
707 A.2d at 817 (citing Baer v. 
First Options of Chicago, Inc., 72 
F.3d 1294 (7th Cir. 1995)). The 
court agreed that Rule 1.5(e) 
establishes public policy with 
regard to the splitting of fees 
among attorneys and that its 
application should not be limited 
to the disciplinary context. Id. at 
168, 707 A.2d at 818. Although 
the rule was not a per se defense, 
the court held that it could be 
used to render agreements which 
are "in clear and flagrant 
violation" of the rule 
unenforceable. Id. 
Finally, the court annunciated 
a number of factors to be 
considered by a trial court when 
confronted with a defense arising 
from Rule 1.5(e). Id. at 169-70, 
707 A.2d at 819. Some of the 
factors a trial court must analyze 
to determine the significance of a 
violation include any harm done 
to the client, the good faith of the 
lawyers involved, and the public's 
interest in enforcement. Id. Like 
any equitable defense, the court 
held the "principles of equity" 
should be applied when raising a 
Rule 1.5(e) violation. Id. 
Judge Chasnow rejected the 
majority opinion's application of 
Rule 1.5(e) to the instant case. 
Id. at 173, 707 A.2d at 821 
(Chasnow, J. dissenting). Even if 
such an ethical defense could be 
raised in other cases, Chasnow 
disagreed with its application to 
the present facts for the simple 
reason that Post, "not only 
entered into [the contract], but ... 
made the proposal himself." Id. at 
174, 707 A.2d at 822. Further, 
Bregman should not have to 
prove that he did the requisite 
proportion of work as a condition 
precedent to receiving the money. 
Id. at 178-79, 707 A.2d 823-24. 
To determine validity, the contract 
must be reasonable when it was 
initiated, not after the case was 
complete. Id. at 180, 707 A.2d at 
825. Accordingly, unless the 
contract was clearly improper or 
unethical when it was entered 
into, the terms should be 
enforced regardless of 
subsequent events. Id. at 181, 
707 A.2d at 825. 
The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland's ruling in Post v. 
Bregman gives tremendous 
significance to the Maryland 
Lawyers' Rules of Professional 
Conduct. Circumstances to 
which they apply are no longer 
strictly limited to disciplinary 
proceedings. More speCifically, 
the court's holding that Rule 
1.5(e) can be raised as an 
equitable defense to contracts 
entered into between lawyers 
regarding the division of fees is 
likely to have a great impact on 
the legal community. Attorneys 
will now have to take great pains 
to further account for the amount 
of work done when such an 
agreement is established. 
